

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 17 May 2005		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Partnering With The Former Enemy's Military During Stability And Security Operations: A Critical Operational Decision				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel John L. Mayer USMC Paper Advisor (if Any): Professor Nicholas E. Reynolds				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT In future conflicts, strategic and operational commanders must make the determination to disband or use the former enemy's military during the post-combat Stability and Security Operations (SASO) phase. Although not practical in every conflict, there will certainly be conflicts, such as OIF-1, where using the former military as part of the occupation force is the right decision. To prepare for future use of the enemy military, the operational commander should follow the CENTCOM model used in preparation for OIF-1 by conducting integrated psychological, information, and intelligence operations targeting the willingness of susceptible enemy units to partner with Coalition forces. Commanders must have a prepared plan, task organization, and maneuver concept that capitalizes on the enemy soldiers' readiness to be co-opted by the Coalition and quickly transitions individual soldiers and units into partners. Within four months of the end of major combat operations, former enemy forces should be employed as constabulary units and used in economy of force missions in areas more accepting to the American-led occupation. A 20 to 1000 occupation force-to-civilian ratio is optimal for successful nation-building operations so that overwhelming occupation force presence is felt by the defeated nation. Strong security measures like martial law must be enforced to maintain a high state of security and defeat the "never defeated syndrome." This deters an insurgency and reinforces to the civilian population that the former regime was defeated and that the occupation force is capable of maintaining security during the reconstruction process. To achieve this stable post-conflict environment, operational commanders should use the former military to augment the Coalition force.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Stability and Security Operations; SASO; disbanding; former military; occupation; martial law; force-to-civilian ratio; troop-to-task; post-conflict; military governor; civil-military					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

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Newport, RI

**PARTNERING WITH THE FORMER ENEMY'S MILITARY DURING STABILITY
AND SECURITY OPERATIONS: A *CRITICAL OPERATIONAL DECISION***

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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17 May 2005

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Abstract

In future conflicts, strategic and operational commanders must make the determination to disband or use the former enemy's military during the post-combat Stability and Security Operations (SASO) phase. Although not practical in every conflict, there will certainly be conflicts, such as OIF-1, where using the former military as part of the occupation force is the right decision.

To prepare for future use of the enemy military, the operational commander should follow the CENTCOM model used in preparation for OIF-1 by conducting integrated psychological, information, and intelligence operations targeting the willingness of susceptible enemy units to partner with Coalition forces. Commanders must have a prepared plan, task organization, and maneuver concept that capitalizes on the enemy soldiers' readiness to be co-opted by the Coalition and quickly transitions individual soldiers and units into partners. Within four months of the end of major combat operations, former enemy forces should be employed as constabulary units and used in economy of force missions in areas more accepting to the American-led occupation. A 20 to 1000 occupation force-to-civilian ratio is optimal for successful nation-building operations so that overwhelming occupation force presence is felt by the defeated nation. Strong security measures like martial law must be enforced to maintain a high state of security and defeat the "never defeated syndrome." This deters an insurgency and reinforces to the civilian population that the former regime was defeated and that the occupation force is capable of maintaining security during the reconstruction process. To achieve this stable post-conflict environment, operational commanders should use the former military to augment the Coalition force.

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"For him who into battle goes—each soul that, hitting hard or hit, endureth gross or ghostly foes. Prince, blown by many overthrows, half blind with shame, half choked with dirt, Man cannot tell, but Allah knows How much the other side was hurt!"

Rudyard Kipling: Verses on Games 1898

Introduction

The first time we met was on the field of battle in An Nasiriyah as the infantry battalion I commanded crossed the Euphrates River enroute to Baghdad. We continued to clash in every town along the length of Highway 7--now legendary as the "100 mile gunfight"--as my battalion spearheaded our regiment's assault to fix and to help destroy the Baghdad Division in Al Kut. We captured some, destroyed many, but for the most part the enemy soldiers remained an elusive, faceless adversary somewhere between us and our goal in Baghdad. During the march up to Baghdad, I remember thinking how clear and simple this kill or be killed relationship was.

Once we crossed the Tigris River our relationship changed. While some still fought, many more could be seen unarmed, in civilian clothes, and walking southeast away from Baghdad. Some smiled, some looked angry, but they all looked relieved that we let them pass as we continued to drive north. Once the fighting ended in Baghdad, we saw many in civilian clothes participating in the mass looting of the Baath regime's infrastructure and I remember asking myself what we were going to do with all these former soldiers. I, of course, had no answer, but hoped someone did.

The hard part of war started 21 April 2003 when I became the military governor of Babylon Province and assumed responsibility for an estimated 18,000 former Iraqi soldiers. At first they sent emissaries, obviously former high-ranking officers, who claimed they represented the whole. Their need was to them simple and straightforward: they wanted their military jobs back as they had not been paid in four months by Saddam's system and they needed to support their families. They said the majority of their men purposely did not fight

the American-led Coalition and were ready to build a new Iraq. That the men before me could organize, equip, and make ready the “good Iraqi soldiers”ⁱ who would work alongside the Coalition forces to stop the crime and protect the borders. What was never said, but implied, was that the former soldiers were willing to fight for the right reason, but chose not to risk their lives for Saddam because the Coalition offered a chance at freedom, economic prosperity, and a better life for their families--the “American dream.” Of course, that could all change if things didn’t go their way.

As the weeks and then months passed we waited first for the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to make a decision about what to do with the former military. In time, the Iraqi soldiers’ cordiality gave way to mild protests, then to non-violent and violent demonstrations, and finally to the guerrilla warfare we see today. I did my best to find jobs for the former soldiers—conservation corps-type cleanup projects, police duty, and security needs provided employment for some. On 15 July 2003, CPA started paying a monthly stipend to the former soldiers that helped feed the families, but did little to fix the unemployment problem. On 2 August 2003, the Coalition began training the first 1000 recruits of the New Iraqi Army and on 3 September 2003, CPA announced and started the process of forming provincial national guard units. These initiatives hired many former soldiers, but indeed, the lack of a coherent plan and action immediately following combat or even months later had already created enemies out of many of the 450,000 former soldiers who once had the potential to be our friends. The Coalition failed to take advantage of opportunity and continues to pay for that mistake today.

This study analyzes the pros and cons of disbanding the Iraqi Army during Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF-1) and recommends to future operational-level commanders that under the right conditions, such as existed during OIF-1, they use former enemy soldiers to

augment coalition forces during the post-combat Stability and Security Operations (SASO) phase. In particular, the operational commander should take three considerations into account when deciding whether to disband or use the enemy military immediately following major offensive operations. First, operational commanders should consider feedback from pre-war and wartime psychological, information, and intelligence-gathering operations targeting susceptible enemy units' willingness to partner with Coalition forces. Second, history has shown that an overwhelming occupation force-to-civilian ratio is needed for successful nation-building operations. Under the right conditions, co-opted former military units could be used as partners to bring the force ratio up to the desired level. Finally, when major operations achieve a swift, decisive victory that leaves a largely unharmed enemy military and a civilian population largely untouched by the war, the operational commander should employ and use the co-opted former military units to help enforce strong security measures during the occupation. This deters the former regime's supporters from rising up in an insurgency and reduces crime. Most importantly, the strong security measures reinforce to the civilian population that the former regime was defeated and that the occupation force is capable of maintaining security during the reconstruction process.

Context--Disbanding the Iraqi Army

Strategic and operational military leaders had planned to use select leaders and units from the former regime's army to fill the security requirements gap. General Tommy Franks, the theater commander stated: "Our planning assumption was that we would guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military and a paramilitary security force drawn from the better units of the defeated regular army. These units would serve side-by-side with Coalition forces to restore order and prevent clashes among the religious and ethnic factions."ⁱⁱⁱ He describes how retaining the former military would be good for the economy while

maintaining stability. “Reconstruction—including a host of New Deal-style public works projects—would be required to employ large numbers of Iraqis to jump-start momentum to build a ‘new Iraq.’ With a disciplined, Arabic-speaking security force cooperating with the Coalition military, the stage would be set for reconstruction nationwide.... Putting Iraqi soldiers to work as soon as possible would be key to stability... before those former soldiers found other—illegal—ways to earn money.”ⁱⁱⁱ

In contrast to the theater’s commander’s plan to use the defeated Iraqi soldiers, the CPA decided to abolish the Iraqi Army and build from the ground up. This decision was based on several critical factors. First CPA decision makers desired to build a new Iraqi Army that was free of former regime corruption and influence, and to allow equal opportunity to all ethnic groups. The concern was that the former regime “had so permeated Iraqi institutions—the security forces of course, but also the ministries that controlled electrical power, oil production, public health, education, [and] telecommunications” that a thorough screening of leaders and units needed to be done first.^{iv} Second, a large percent of the Iraqi soldiers simply took off their uniforms and blended into the civilian masses leaving no organized units intact. Third, the complete and rampant looting of Baath party infrastructures following the Coalition’s assault had totally decimated the Iraqi military’s support structure. Any support for the new Iraqi soldiers would have to be re-built from the ground up. Finally, if Saddam’s military was re-packaged, it would not be accepted by the Shiite majority or the Kurds.^v Mr. Douglas Feith, a senior deputy in the Defense Department, accurately sums the CPA’s reasons for disbanding the military: “When we saw that the Army did not remain in units, that the [soldiers] disappeared, that the looters had stripped all of the infrastructure, all of the various pros that weighed in favor of using the army had been negated by events. And we were left with the cons, a bad, corrupt, cruel and undemocratic army.”^{vi}

When CPA announced on 23 May 2003 that the former Iraqi Army was officially demobilized I was not surprised, but I was disappointed with the decision.^{vii} In Babylon, we had already organized a Veterans Affairs office that employed former officers to act as emissaries between myself and the reported 18,000 soldiers in the area. I saw on several occasions the ability of the former leaders to organize, muster, and execute actions involving as many as six thousand of these soldiers.^{viii} Obviously, the leaders still maintained some authority, level of trust, and command and control with their men. I know they felt responsible for their welfare and took it personally every time something didn't materialize the way the former soldiers wanted. Although we hired as many of the former soldiers as we could to fill security and civil positions, the vast majority felt betrayed and their anger manifested itself in weekly demonstrations that grew in intensity as time wore on. By mid-June, the leaders' efforts turned from positive events such as a job fair recruiting to counter-productive events such as organizing demonstrations in protest of the lack of Coalition action.^{ix} By the time I transferred authority for Babylon Province to the Multi-National Division in early September 2003, my area had not yet received orders to hire and train soldiers for the New Iraqi Army or for what is now known as the Iraqi National Guard. I saw a direct correlation between the length of time to positively employ the former soldiers and the rise in the insurgency. Five months of inaction on our part had turned many of the former soldiers against us and one can only wonder how many are actively involved in the insurgency today in the North Babil area of Iraq.

Deciding to use the Defeated Military

The first of three main operational considerations to consider when deciding to disband or immediately use the former military as a coalition partner is the enemy's willingness to cooperate with the invading force. To determine the extent of enemy

cooperation, the operational commander must purposely plan, implement, and analyze the feedback from psychological, information, and intelligence gathering operations waged before and during actual combat operations. The operational commander should focus on the loyalty of certain enemy units to the enemy regime and any possible divisions among units. Geo-political, cultural, and historic factors must be considered as well as actions of certain units when under hostile conditions. For example critical information requirements the operational commander should consider are: Will the soldiers of a particular unit fight for the current regime or can they be co-opted to our side if we give them a better option? If we think they can be co-opted, what are the indications and warnings we can use to determine whether the unit has been successfully co-opted? Once co-opted, how do we transition the enemy unit from a hostile threat to a useful Coalition partner?

During OPERATION DESERT STORM, a definitive split developed among the regular Iraqi Army units in the North and the South, which mutinied and deserted their posts, as compared to the Republican Guard in central Iraq, which protected the regime in Baghdad.^x U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) recognized this weakness in the regime's forces and leveraged this critical vulnerability in their campaign plan for possible use if American forces ever did invade Iraq. General Anthony Zinni, the former CENTCOM Commanding General from August 1997-July 2000, stated that even after the war CENTCOM continued the "psychological campaign" aimed at gaining the Iraqi soldiers hearts and minds. "Every time we [bombed] Iraq, we dropped leaflets on regular Army formations and garrisons saying "If you don't fight us when the time comes, we'll take care of you' ... We always implied if they didn't fight...[they would be used as a] basic ready-made force to pick up some of the security requirements."^{xi} At the operational level, CENTCOM waged an extensive information campaign for years that set the conditions for

immediately using the Iraqi Army. Although strategic decision makers opted to not use the former military, the operational commander had set the conditions for its use.

There are several tactical-level examples from the first phase of OIF in 2003, often known as OIF-1, which demonstrate how much of a force-multiplier a co-opted enemy unit can be to mission success. In the town of Ad Diwaniyah prior to its liberation by Coalition forces, a former Iraqi Brigadier General named Guad Hani Faris, on his own initiative, “organized Iraqi soldiers into guard forces and protected some of the factories, ammunition supply points, and government buildings in the city until the U.S Army appeared.”^{xii} I also witnessed farsighted Iraqi military, policemen, tribe leaders, and civil servants protecting the most critical buildings and infrastructure for their organizations use once hostilities ended. Sheik Adnon Al Janobi, leader of the Janobi Tribe, told me how he invited and dined with the officers of the Iraqi military unit stationed near his tribal home in Northern Babil just days prior to Coalition’s projected arrival in the area, and persuaded the soldiers to not fight the Americans. He said his tribesman and some of the now former soldiers then protected key infrastructure from being looted. In particular, he said his men protected the regional electric power plant and a key bridge from being completely destroyed by withdrawing Republican Guardsmen and Saddam Fedayeen, the paramilitary fighters loyal to the dictator.^{xiii} What the Coalition failed to do was anticipate enemy actions like those described above, establish a means to detect enemy units’ willingness to partner with the Coalition, and develop branch plans ready to capitalize on the newly created opportunities.

These examples highlight several critical lessons for the operational commander to take advantage of enemy military units showing a willingness to partner with Coalition forces. First, there needs to be a plan built into the pre-conflict and conflict phases of the operation that enables identification of enemy soldiers’ and units’ intent to cooperate with Coalition forces. The execution of this plan would involve a focused psychological and

information operation designed to persuade the enemy soldiers that it is better to join the Coalition than to fight it. Just as importantly, intelligence-gathering assets must be dedicated to receiving the enemy soldiers' intent to partner with the Coalition. Next, branch and sequel plans must be developed to prepare friendly forces to capitalize on actions like General Faris' in Ad Diwanyiah. Finally, former enemy units that now are cooperating with Coalition forces must be used in a manner to prevent fratricide with follow-on Coalition forces, while ensuring the civilian population understands what is happening. All this must be done while maintaining a high state of force protection to ensure the newly co-opted enemy unit has pure intentions. This entire transition from combatant-to-adjacent forces must be thoroughly planned and expertly supervised in execution. A velvet hammer approach that reinforces and maintains the 1st Marine Division's motto: "No better friend, no worse enemy" must be used when working with the newly co-opted soldiers. Although many former military units may initially be co-opted to serve alongside the Coalition, historically it takes a lot more than just their not fighting in combat to maintain their willingness to assist the Coalition during the arduous reconstruction process.

The Requirement for Overwhelming Occupation Forces

The second consideration the operational commander must consider is the need to achieve an overwhelming number of occupation forces-to-civilian ratio. A recent RAND Corporation study of seven post-World War II nation-building operations concluded that what determined whether a nation-building effort succeeded or failed was not the cultural, economic, or political demographics of a nation, but the level of friendly "troops, money, and time" put into the operation.^{xiv} Specifically, the study concluded that "[t]here appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the military stabilization force and the level of

casualties. The higher the proportion of troops relative to the resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.”^{xv}

Based on the RAND study, the optimal number of occupation troops to civilians is 20 soldiers per 1000 civilians. Considered experts in counter-insurgency operations, the British maintained this ratio and achieved success in Northern Ireland and Malaysia. With an estimated 25 million citizens in Iraq, the Coalition forces would have to increase its numbers three times over to reach the optimal 500,000 soldier occupation force. Further, this number doesn’t take into account troop rotations that would require a ratio of “five soldiers for every one deployed” to maintain a sustainable occupation force.^{xvi} With the entire U.S. military hovering around a million men and women, a less-than-enthusiastic international community, and multiple forward deployed American forces in other contingencies, the Coalition force strength in Iraq has never come close nor does it look possible for the occupational force to reach the optimal occupation forces-to-civilian ratio.

One factor the operational commander must consider when deciding the necessary troop strength is the incredible troop-to-task the tactical commanders constantly juggle. Generally, one third of the tactical force is always conducting force protection; one third is resting, maintaining, and preparing to conduct tactical missions; and the other third is executing the unit’s enduring stability missions. When such tasks as guarding munitions depots, civil infrastructure, higher headquarters’ command posts, and convoys are assigned, the tactical commander must use forces from the one third conducting SASO tasks to accomplish the new missions. While all the tasks are necessary to sustain the force, the tactical commander quickly loses the ability to positively shape his battle space.

For example, in Babylon Province my occupation forces-to-civilian strength ratio was 1100 Marines to an estimated 1.5 million civilians—or 29,000 Marines short of the ideal numbers. I was responsible for one major city with a population of 500,000 and the

remaining civilians were spread throughout the 80 kilometer by 80 kilometer province in seven smaller towns and vast rural areas. Babylon also had two large Iraqi munitions depots that had to be guarded. Each one required at least a reinforced platoon to guard it full time. Due to this manpower drain, I was authorized to hire, train, equip, and pay Iraqi civilians to guard the depots. This process required an immense amount of time and resources, and produced poor results. It would have been much more effective to use former Iraqi military units that were already organized and trained to perform this type of mission. Certainly the former military would need supervision, but probably not as much as the civilian guards required. Most importantly, if former Iraqi military units had been used, it would have kept the former soldiers employed and their time occupied in a positive manner.

Strategic decision makers must carefully weigh the ability of the operational commander to raise and maintain a necessary occupation force-to-civilian ratio before deciding to commit the military to the mission. Once the decision has been made at the strategic level, the operational commander must do his best to achieve the optimal ratio with the troop strength allocated to his command. The difference between provided and desired troop strength then becomes operational risk that the commander must find ways to mitigate. In the case of OIF-1, this study proposes that many of the former regular Army units from the northern and southern regions of Iraq could have been used to augment the Coalition. As observed in Babylon, once the Coalition had divided the country into military provinces and commanders had begun reconstruction, the remnants of regional Iraqi military forces could have been re-mustered, officers and soldiers rapidly sent through a vetting process, and re-organized to guard infrastructure, clear munitions, assist in law enforcement and check point operations, and secure borders. With these newly co-opted Coalition forces conducting economy of force missions in areas friendly to the Coalition's aims, a larger portion of

American forces could then be freed to operate in the more volatile areas, such as the so-called Sunni Triangle of Iraq.

Defeating the “Never Defeated Syndrome”

The third consideration the operational commander must weigh in his decision to disband or use the former military can be referred to as the “never defeated syndrome.” The RAND study found that when a “conflict has been terminated less conclusively and destructively...we have seen more difficult post-conflict security challenges. Indeed, it seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult can be the task of post-conflict stabilization.”^{xvii}

One vivid example of this can be gleamed from post-World War I Germany. A recent Defense Science Board Study found that the combined collapse of the Western Front and Austria-Hungary border and the desertion of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers enabled Allied forces to sweep through Germany without the total devastation found elsewhere on the European Continent. This left the aggressor nation relatively untouched by the war and a population susceptible to the psychological influence of Adolf Hitler. His influence caused many of the German “upper and middle classes [to] become firmly convinced that the German Army had had not been defeated and that their leaders had been tricked into agreeing to an armistice.”^{xviii} Hitler fostered this “never defeated” belief and used it as added fuel for his purposes. Allied decision makers preparing for post-World War II reconstruction of Germany realized this mistake from WWI, and ensured it did not happen twice. They adopted a policy of “unconditional surrender” and backed it by ensuring an overwhelming occupation forces-to-civilian presence to reinforce the feeling of defeat in the German population.^{xix}

History has shown that the enemy society has “to recognize that it has been defeated. Without that acceptance, the defeated have inevitably bided their time with the aim of overturning the result.”^{xx} For example, in the former Confederate states after the American Civil War, General Lee’s surrender at Appomattox ended major combat operations and left the South’s male population and natural resources devastated. Although their homeland had been destroyed by the war, thousands of now former Confederate soldiers and the population in general were unwilling to recognize their defeat. Many Confederates continued to fight the reconstruction government—“especially any institution or practice that helped the former slaves [to strive for] equality”—by participating in terror violence through the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations. So great was the terror that in many regions of the South, it undermined everything the reconstruction government tried to do. The violence achieved exactly what the Klansmen wanted—citizens questioning the legitimacy of the reconstruction government. One Klan victim expressed for all “I consider a government which does not protect its citizens an utter failure.”^{xxi}

Many Iraqi’s would agree with the above statement due to the Coalition’s inability to stop the terror attacks in many of the former regime strongholds. Ralph Peters points out “[t]he Sunni-Arab heartlands of Iraq—the source of support for Saddam Hussein’s regime—never felt the agony of [OIF-1’s] war. Many a Sunni-Arab town or city hardly saw an American soldier or Marine for months after we believed we had won decisively. Our enemy didn’t feel defeated. He felt tricked, betrayed, and shamed.”^{xxii}

One method the operational commander can use to ensure the enemy nation feels defeated, but well secured is for the occupation force to enforce martial law. It is imperative that the “defeated population see their occupiers at virtually every turn.” The conquering force “must impose martial law immediately... [It] has nothing to do with capricious brutality. Rather it assures the population that their persons and their property will be safe,

even though their world has collapsed around them.”^{xxiii} Every expert on reconstruction—whether his expertise is political, military, or economic—agrees that a secure, stable environment is the essential foundation for success.

Consistently, many Iraqis I met insisted security was more important than any civil service or infrastructure improvement. They did not object to the Coalition’s presence as long as it maintained security. It was my experience that for a period of four months following the liberation from Saddam, the Iraqi population did not mind the normal security operations associated with martial law as long as the actions were carried out efficiently, effectively, and with respect to local customs and courtesies. For example, when conducting vehicle control point inspections, if the check point was well-organized, if the Marines treated the passengers respectfully, and if the inspections contributed to a stable environment, then the Iraqi citizens welcomed the heightened measures. However, due to the low occupation forces-to-civilian ratio, we did not even consider instituting a post WW II-type martial law because we could not maintain the overwhelming presence required to foster this sense of a defeated, but safe environment that history has shown us is necessary for success.

The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual--derived from years campaigning in such places as Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Nicaragua during the first part of the 20th century—advocates raising an army and police force from the occupied nation and forming a “constabulary” force responsible for law enforcement as well as country defense. The manual describes a building block organization and training process. Initially, American officers and NCOs lead an all-volunteer enlisted native force that transitions to an all-native force working adjacent to U.S. units. Once the constabulary gains basic-level collective skills, the U.S units then transition to a “guidance and observation” role. In the final stage of transition, once the constabulary demonstrates “competence to perform its duties,” then the

American forces relinquish control of security responsibility and move to centrally located bases and assume an as needed reinforcement role.^{xxiv}

Counter-argument

Many might agree with the CPA's argument that using the former military immediately following major offensive operations would keep the former regime's influence in a powerful position and not be accepted by the now liberated population. This is an argument that bears close scrutiny and has many aspects that need to be considered with each conflict. One way to deconstruct this argument is to ask what would happen if coalition forces do not use the former military to boost our overall troop strength. In OIF-1, the Coalition's lack of troop strength, large number of tasks assigned, and enormous area of operation, forced the tactical commanders to rely on the former regime's Iraqi Police (IP) and Traffic Police to augment security enforcement requirements. This created significant problems that had far-reaching ramifications.

For example, the IP force inherited in Babylon was inept, heavy-handed, and corrupt. The citizens distrusted the former police more than any other institution and were amazed the Coalition worked with and placed them in a position of power. Although tactical commanders were authorized to hire and train former soldiers as IPs, many of the former soldiers, especially the good ones, did not want to be associated with the police. Further, many of the tasks Coalition forces needed assistance with, such as guard duty of large ammunition depots, did not readily transfer over to the IP's skill set. The CPA decided to use much of the former regime's existing infrastructure-such as electrical engineers, school teachers, civil servants, and politicians--to begin the reconstruction process, but chose the police rather than the military to partner with for security reform. This not only broke CENTCOM's promise to the soldiers, it put the tactical commanders in a dilemma by

partnering Coalition forces on the ground with the unpopular IP force, while creating enemies out of the more useful and numerous former military force.

Although the IP, Iraqi Army, and National Guard units in many areas of Iraq have evolved into the useful, productive security force we see today, this process took almost two years to achieve success. Indeed, it was the Coalition's lack of action in regard to partnering with the former military during the first four months following major combat operations—mainly caused by the disbanding of the Iraqi military and slow initiation of the new Iraqi security forces--that we lost the trust and confidence of the Iraqi soldiers. Then, due to our further inability to secure the citizens, we lost the trust and confidence of the civilian population that was our duty to protect.

Conclusion

In future conflicts, strategic and operational commanders must make the determination to disband or use the former enemy's military. Although not practical in every conflict's SASO phase, there will certainly be conflicts, such as OIF-1, where using the former military as part of the occupation force is the right decision. To prepare for future use of the enemy military, Combatant Commanders should follow the CENTCOM model used in preparation for OIF-1 by conducting integrated psychological, information, and intelligence operations targeting the willingness of susceptible enemy units to partner with Coalition forces. The operations should answer the operational commander's critical information requirements focusing on the enemy soldiers' intentions once combat commences.

Operational and tactical commanders must have a prepared plan, task organization, and maneuver concept that capitalizes on the enemy soldiers' readiness to be co-opted by the Coalition and quickly transitions individual soldiers and units into Coalition partners. As soon as practical, but within four months of the end of major combat operations, former

enemy forces should be employed as constabulary units and used in economy of force missions in areas more accepting to the American-led occupation. In areas that have a large population of civilians that supported the former regime, Coalition forces should strive to achieve a 20 to 1000 occupation force-to-civilian ratio so that overwhelming occupation force presence is felt by the defeated nation. Additionally, strong security measures like martial law must be enforced to maintain a high state of security and defeat the “never defeated syndrome.” To achieve this stable post-conflict environment, operational commanders should use the former military to augment the Coalition force.

Notes

ⁱ “Good Iraqi Soldiers” or “Good Iraqi” was an expression often used by Iraqis to describe a non-Baathist, pro-Coalition Iraqi citizen.

ⁱⁱ Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper-Collins 2004), 419.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid, 522.

^{iv} Ibid, 525.

^v Michael R. Gordon, “Debate Lingering On Decision To Dissolve The Iraqi Military,” New York Times, 21 October 2004, A:1.

^{vi} Ibid, Sec. A1.

^{vii} Nicholas E. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond. (Unpublished Manuscript, U.S Naval War College, Newport RI: 2005), 151. Advanced copy of book to be published by U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD in mid-2005.

^{viii} Most notable example of the Babylon V.A.’s ability to organize the former soldiers was an American-style job fair held in the Al Hillah soccer stadium where an estimated 6000 former soldiers attended.

^{ix} After several demonstrations, I began suspecting that the V.A.’s leadership was organizing productive events one day and demonstrations the next. My suspicions came true one day in June 2003 as I watched in utter disbelief as scores of buses and vans dropped off former soldiers at the V.A. building. The V.A.’s leadership then organized, formed, and marched the soldiers on my Civil Military Affairs Center located in the Al Hillah City Hall to protest the lack of employment and salary payments. My learning into the Iraqi males psyche was great this day!

^x Faleh A. Jabar, “The Iraqi Army and Anti-Army: Some Reflections on the Role of the Military,” Adelphi Papers, (January 2003): 119-121

^{xi} Anthony Zinni, “Gen Anthony Zinni, USMC, (Ret.) Remarks at CDI Board of Directors Dinner, May 12, 2004”, Center For Defense Information, 22 May 2004, <<http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2208>>, [16 May 2005]

^{xii} Reynolds, 149-150.

^{xiii} I worked with Adnon Al Janobi throughout the summer of 2003 organizing various civil-military projects and hiring Janobis in security positions. Every Friday at 1100, I would meet the leaders of the Janobi tribe at Adnon’s home in North Babil to discuss security concerns and employment opportunities. After our meeting, Adnon would serve barbeque chicken and fish, and watermelon. Although I dined with many tribe leaders throughout the summer, Adnon’s barbecue was the most American and memorable.

^{xiv} James Dobbins, “Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower,” Rand Review, Summer 2003, 17.

^{xv} Ibid, 17.

^{xvi} James T. Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” Rand Review, (Summer 2003): 28-29.

^{xvii} Dobbins, 24.

^{xviii} Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study: Transition To and From Hostilities Supporting Papers. (Washington, DC: 2004), 64. The study was printed in two documents: the Summer Study and the Supporting Papers. Both documents are cited.

^{xix} Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study: Transition To and From Hostilities. (Washington, DC: 2004), 20.

^{xx} Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Supporting Papers. 63-64.

^{xxi} Foner, Eric, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Row 1988), 443.

^{xxii} Ralph Peters, “A Grave New World: 10 Lessons From the War in Iraq,” Armed Forces Journal, (April 2005): 35.

^{xxiii} Ralph Peters, 35.

^{xxiv} United States Marine Corps, The Small Wars Manual, , NAVMC 2890 (Washington DC: 1940), Chapter 12, 1-25.

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